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Discussions on 
 Operational Art 
The Bridge between 
Deterministic Combat 
Analysis and the actual 
Complex Adaptive System 
known as War 
Referencing Combat Planning 
Models: Sun-Tzu 
Sun-Tzu’s calculations: 
–  “As for military methods: the first is termed measurement: 
the second estimation [of forces]; the third, calculation [of 
numbers of men]; the fourth, weighing [relative strength]; 
and the fifth, victory. 
–  “Terrain gives birth to measurement; measurement produces 
the estimation [of forces].  Estimation [of forces] gives rise 
calculating [the numbers of men].  Calculating [the numbers 
of men] gives rise to weighing [relative strength].  Weighing 
[strength] gives birth to victory.” 
Distance + Force Structure + Logistics Capability + Time = 
Combat Potential at objective 
 
Combat Potential vs Enemy Combat potential comparison 
at objective generates courses of action for victory!  
 
Kline’s Read: 
Sun-Tzu’s further Models 
Sun-Tzu’s strategy after calculations: 
–  “In general, the strategy for employing the military 
is this:  If your strength is ten times theirs, 
surround them; if five, then attack them; if double, 
then divide your forces.”   
Where do you think he came up with 
this rule? 
Have we similar rules of thumb?  Where 
did we come up with them? 
Some Historical Examples of 
Combat Planning Models 
w  Sun-Tzu, Clausewitz, Jomini, and other 
classical writers discuss numbers in 
warfare from their strategic writings. 
w  Likewise, Lanchester and Hughes (and 
many others) created equations to describe 
attrition and naval warfare respectively. 
w  Next slide highlights examples used in 
warfare planning or execution. 
Some Historical Examples of 
Analysis in Warfare 
w  Admiral Doenitz “Battle of Atlantic” winning criteria: 600K – 800K 
tonnage sunk 
–  Analytical Derivation 
w  War Plan Orange 
–  Wargaming 
w  Battle of Atlantic (Birth of Ops Research) 
–  Search Theory 
w  Battle of Bismark Sea (WWII) 
–  Game Theory 
w  Vietnam “Body Count” 
–  Measure of Effectiveness Gone Bad? 
w  Vietnam Air-to-Air Combat Analysis 
–  Data Analysis 
w  Gulf War, Kosovo, and OIF Effects of Strikes 
–  Network Analysis and Scheduling 
w  Current OPLANS?  
Warfare Analysis: Tidy Statements 
about Untidy Phenomena 
w  SO many estimates and assumptions: 
–  Weapon accuracy and effectiveness 
–  Sensor effectiveness 
–  Aircraft availability, load capacity, turn-around times, range 
–  Enemy Capabilities 
w  Then we build “Transparent” and artificially neat models in 
an attempt to: 
–  Show a clear cause and effect 
–  By well defined inputs that cover all the vital variables! 
w  NOT an engineering approach! 
–  Messy problems, “dirty data”, complex activities, multiple courses 
of action for both sides, unclear results 
–  Best: Hope to derive gross-level patterns and identify what is 
important. 
DOES NOT PREDICT OUTCOMES! 
Models 
w  White Papers: Logical and based on analytical 
computations 
w  Mathematical Statements and Applied Math: 
–  Optimization 
–  Search Equations 
–  Statistics and Probability 
–  Data Analysis 
w  “Closed” Simulation 
w  War Game (“Manned” Simulation) 
w  Field Experiments 
Inputs 
Models 
+ Process Results 
Each has strengths and 
weaknesses depending 
on the problem! 
Does it aid the Decision Maker? 
Does it help quantify risk? 
“Bottom Line” of Warfare Analysis 
But Clausewitz says: 
“…Absolute, so-called mathematical factors never 
find a firm basis in military calculations…In the 
whole range of human activities, war most closely 
resembles a game of cards…the art of war deals 
with living and with moral forces.  Consequently, it 
cannot attain the absolute, or certainty; it must 
always leave a margin for uncertainty, in the 
greatest things as much as in the smallest.” 
On War, p. 86 
Or…War is Complex, Adaptive, and a System… 
of Opposing multiple Systems of Systems! 
Complex Adaptive Systems 
(CAS) defined 
“consisting of many nonlinearly interacting  
elements which can adapt their dynamical behavior to external  
influences…” Heinz Georg Schuster   
“A CAS behaves/evolves according to three key principles: 
order is emergent as opposed to predetermined,  
the system's history is irreversible,  
and the system's future is often unpredictable…” Kevin Dooley 
 
And Actual War is: 
A Human endeavor involving: 
opposing wills with varying and changing 
objectives at various interacting strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels; 
using dependent and inclusive mechanical, 
technical, human and environmental 
systems; 
and whose “state” is temporally dependent. 
 
Or…War is Complex, Adaptive, and a System… 
of Opposing multiple Systems of Systems! 
“Instead of planning an action in advance we specify 
constraints and then allow the local conditions at the 
time to determine how the task will be done. This is 
the essence of distributed systems, each task responds to 
the local environment in real time, the interactions 
between the system and environment allow an emergent 
solution to arise. Power is localized, not concentrated 
and this allows fast responses to unforeseeable events, a 
flexibility that removes the rework costs inherent in more 
static plans. This is a open, parallel mode of operation, 
where multiple options can be tried simultaneously, 
compared to the closed, serial mode of conventional 
management where decisions move linearly up and down 
fixed command chains.”  
So, how do use the Complex 
Adaptive System concept of War? 
Chris Lucas   
Sounds like a Conflict Here! 
“Oh so 20th-Century” Combat Analysis 
VS 
The “New Science” Concept of  
War as a Complex Adaptive System 
Na….What is required is a little Operational Art! 
After a break? 
Operational Art 
“The employment of military forces to attain strategic  
and/or operational objective through the design, 
organization, integration, and conduct of theater strategies, 
campaigns, major operations, and decisive battle.  
Operational art translates combatant strategy and theater 
design into operational design and ultimately, tactical action 
by integrating the key activities of all levels of war within a 
theater.  “ 
Joint Pub 1-02 
Elements of Operational Art 
Synergy, simultaneity and depth, anticipation, 
balance, 
leverage, timing and tempo, operational reach and 
approach, 
forces and functions, arranging operations, centers 
of gravity, 
Direct vs. indirect approach, decisive points, 
culmination, and 
finally,…………………………….. termination. 
Joint Pub 3-0 
OR……. 
The Commander uses Operational Art to “shape initial 
conditions” (or adjust conditions during execution) to 
create an environment that allows the “emergent 
behavior” of the nation’s strategic, operational, and/or 
tactical goals from the complex adaptive system of 
opposing system of systems known as war.  
The Commander uses all the elements of 
Operational art to establish the desirable 
conditions before, during, and after combat. 
Nice Concept:   
But just how the heck do we ID 
the right “initial conditions” 
during our planning process? 
Recall from Warfare Analysis Slides: 
w  we build “Transparent” and artificially neat models in an 
attempt to: 
–  Show a clear cause and effect 
–  By well defined inputs that cover all the vital variables! 
w  NOT an engineering approach! 
–  Messy problems, “dirty data”, complex activities, multiple 
courses of action for both sides, unclear results 
–  Best: Hope to derive gross-level patterns and identify what is 
important. 
We use “oh so 20th Century Warfare Analysis” to help 
define IMPORTANT “initial conditions”.   
Are the always the “right” ones?   
No: or else war would be predictable 
and not a Complex Adaptive System! 
 
A Picture 
River of Reality 
Shore of: 
Joint Planning Process 
Warfare Analysis 
Commander’s Estimates 
Technical Rational Thought 
Shore of War:  






Can we leverage superior information systems and dominate 
air/maritime capabilities to apply distributed ground forces 
at decisive points through out the ground battle space with 
a command structure and rules of engagement structure 
allowing local initiative to realize: 
Accelerated Cumulative Warfare! 
Cumulative Warfare + Rapid Execution enabled by 
Information dominance, precision weapons, dominant 
Maneuver and focused logistics 
Accelerated Cumulative Warfare 
“I now think that the information-management revolution has 
probably made cumulative strategies more readily subject to 
analysis in planning before events, in carrying out those  plans, and 
in the retrospective analysis of what has already taken place.” 
Military Strategy: Wylie 
Special Ops Strategies? Is it possible? 
And the Finish: 
We recognize the Complex Adaptive Systems 
nature of war with its non-linear, unpredictable,  
dynamic, interactive nature and sensitivity to 
conditions…  
We use Warfare Analysis to help identify important 
conditions to set to increase expectations of 
obtaining a desired objective… 
We use Operational Art to Set those Conditions… 
 
